Undergraduate Students Papers

Between a Missile and a Hard Place

Anonymous — Mon, 29 Apr 2019 15:23:54 +0000

Between a Missile and a Hard Place Anonymous (not verified) Mon, 04/29/2019 - 09:23

Student Name: Drew Spitzer

Course: PSCI 3022

Instructor: Prof. Sarah Sokhey

Published: March 15, 2019

The INF Treaty, or the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, was first brought into place in 1987, signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan. This treaty was a significant step in the de-escalation of the Cold War and also signified a cooperation between the USSR and the U.S. that they had not seen since WWII. 32 years later, on February 2nd, President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would cease to honor the INF Treaty due to allegations against Russia for not complying with the INF regulations. Russia denies these claims and calls for evidence to be shown to validate U.S. accusations. If the Russian government wants to avoid a long term escalation in a missile arms race, or further damage relations with the U.S., it should comply with the existing treaty, or re-negotiate a compromise as a new treaty.

The INF Treaty states that ground launch missiles, whether conventional or ballistic, be prohibited to have a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, requiring all such missiles be destroyed. However, this treaty does not ban the research and development of these missiles, only physical in-flight testing. In recent years, the U.S. has accused Russia of not only testing missiles that break the INF Treaty, but also deploying them in active military situations. While no verifiable proof has been brought forth, at least to public disclosure, on either side, a confrontation ensues as a battle of wills between Trump and Putin, with the idea that neither can step down to lose popularity or appear weak. As journalist Pavel Baev, for The Jamestown Foundation puts it, “Putin seems convinced that any step back from his defiant stance as the challenger of U.S. dominance will be interpreted—by the domestic audience, by Western adversaries and by China—as proof of his weakness.” The idea of Putin backing down in this situation is not feasible for him for two reasons. First, as discussed in the Jamestown article, he would appear weak within the international community and to his own people. This directly breaks the carefully crafted image of a tough, bold, and strict leader of a very powerful country militarily. Secondly, the idea of Putin admitting that they were in violation of the treaty would cause many countries to raise an eyebrow and Russia would come under heavy scrutiny from the international community. In an article on the U.S.’s position on the INF Treaty, TASS quotes Michael Pompeo, current Secretary of State; “Pompeo also said that Washington had ‘raised the Russian non-compliance with Russian officials, including at the highest level of government, more than 30 times.’”. The fact that the U.S. and Russian top political figures have discussed and brought up this issue, further pressures Russia, not to admit wrongdoing and return to compliance, regardless of their claimed innocence or assumed guilt.

With regards as to how Russia should proceed in this argument, their best option would be to come to the table and renegotiate a new treaty that redefines what is acceptable in order to be in compliance, while still respecting an agreed limit. Renegotiating would force honest talk between Russia and the U.S. and promote better relations between the two countries. These weapon platforms, regardless of they are conventional or nuclear provide strategic tactical capabilities to the area they are positioned in. If a new treaty was defined, a shared knowledge of what the other’s capabilities were, would help power projection and overall deterrence regarding their respective militaries. Allowing these new missiles to be built and tested would also help Russia locally in two ways; prevent a potentially costly arms race with the U.S. and spur economic growth within local Russian companies. Russia would not only be risking an arms race economically, but also strategically where each country races to place missiles in tactical locations in order to dissuade the other from using them.

Arguments against Russia renegotiating a new INF Treaty can be seen from two different perspectives; a western perspective, where the belief is that Russia should immediately return to full compliance with the treaty, and the pro-Russian perspective which still assumes innocence from violating the treaty. While the premises for Russia not to enter into negotiations for a new treaty pose significant risks, it will be more viable for them to follow that course of action and not disclose the fact they were in violation of the treaty, regardless of whether they were or not. Fully aware of this, the U.S. most likely hoping that a renegotiation of the treaty is the most plausible option for the foreseeable future, while Russians are posed to remain inactive in their efforts to reach a compromise or admit to any illicit activity.

While the battle of domineering presidents continues, the fact remains that there will most likely be an increase in activity towards strategic deterrence on both sides reminiscent of the Cold War. Both countries undoubtedly have memories of the tension the Cold War caused as they are faced with key decisions that determine military policy. However, this is not the USSR dealing with an united U.S.; this is the Russian Federation dealing with a very divisive American government. As Trump continues to polarize the U.S., while Putin’s approval rating dips, mass support will play a part in this as the age of protests and demonstrations continue to influence how policies are made. Keeping an open mind and a healthy respect for each other will mitigate risks involved in how the Russian and American governments proceed into this new era.

Gathered from article “Russia denies it violates INF Treaty. OK, show it” Brookings.edu

Taken from The Jamestown Foundation, “Russia Enters a Treacherous New Post-Arms Control World

Taken from TASS article “US Suspends INF Treaty Obligations – Pompeo” found on tass.com

See CNBC.com article “The world’s two greatest nuclear powers are ditching a crucial nuke treaty”

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Persecution against LGBT People in Chechnya

Anonymous — Mon, 29 Apr 2019 15:21:03 +0000

Persecution against LGBT People in Chechnya Anonymous (not verified) Mon, 04/29/2019 - 09:21

Student Name: Elizabeth Mather

Course: PSCI 3022

Instructor: Prof. Sarah Sokhey

Published: March 15, 2019

The end of December 2018 marks a new wave of persecution against LGBT people in Chechnya. This is not the first time this has occurred. An attempt by activists to hold a pride parade in April 2017 resulted in at least 100 gay men being rounded up and arrested, and many claim they were tortured by their Russian captors. Meanwhile, Russia is being confronted with international pressure again after authorities detained 40 homosexual men from the North Caucuses of Chechnya who used VKontakte, Russia’s version of Facebook, to communicate with and meet other gay men. The Russian Government backed a 1 n investigation into the deaths and reported torture of gay men in Chechnya in 2017, but authorities found no evidence of
maltreatment.2 These horrific events pose the question: How should the international community hold Russia accountable for human rights violations, specifically against the LGBT community, and ensure they do not continue to occur?

Chechnya, a southwestern republic in Russia known for being extremely conservative and predominantly Muslim, has continuously dismissed the reports as “misinformation.” Ayub Kataev, prison warden and head of Chechnya’s internal affairs, denied the abuse altogether. He has also denied the existence of gay people in Chechnya, stating “My officers would not even want to touch such people, if they exist, let alone beating or torturing them.” He also accused the victims and the Human Rights Watch of lying in an “attempt to destabilize Chechnya.”3 Kataev bolsters his power by dismissing gay people as “not Chechen,” referring to them as “suspicious outsiders,” and using state-sponsored homophobia to pit Chechen citizens against gay people.4 Chechnya’s attitude toward homosexuality is more extreme than Russia’s, but Russia does not support the LGBT community either. Putin signed a “gay propaganda” measure into federal law in 2013, which bans the “promotion of non-traditional sexual relations to minors.”5 This contributed to a state-sponsored intensification of harassment and stigma, resulting in violence against people in the LGBT community and their families.

In Chechnya, gay men who are arrested have their travel documents taken by the Chechen police to prevent them from fleeing the country to seek justice, and their family members are threatened with violence to keep them from speaking publicly about the crackdown.6 Many independent journalists in Russia are also discouraged from reporting on these stories due to the precedent set by the Russian government concerning opposition views, evidenced by the disappearances of Boris Nemtsov and Anna Politkovskaya.7 Surveys indicate that many Russians distrust news about Chechnya (Gehlbach, 2010). This could lead them to underestimate or dismiss Chechnya’s human rights abuses, which could be one explanation for the lack of reporting on the issue.

Historically, Russian people have had negative relations with Chechnya and support Putin’s intervention in the country, along with Putin’s appointment of Ramzan Kadyrov as president of Chechnya. A 2017 survey conducted by the Levada Center in Russia showed that public opinion about Kadyrov was generally positive among Russian citizens. The majority of survey respondents said Kadyrov could be trusted, and they believe the two largest consequences of Kadyrov’s leadership are “complete pacification and establishment of peaceful life in Chechnya” and “Establishing full control of Kadyrov’s clan over Chechnya” (Levada, 2018). As the survey indicated, Russians are not necessarily concerned with Chechnya because they believe Kadyrov is “controlling” it well. This attitude, combined with a distrust of news from Chechnya could mean that they do not see the “gay purges” as a pressing human rights issue, or even as a factual issue.

Research conducted by the Psychology Journal of the Higher School of Economics based in Moscow, found that negative attitudes toward homosexuals were “stronger in males” and among “religious respondents.” According to the International Religious Freedom Report from 2017, 71% of the Russian population considers themselves to be Orthodox Christians, and 10% identify as Muslim. This trend could explain a rise in homophobia, as Islam does not condone homosexuality and the Orthodox Christian Church starkly opposes homosexuality, stating “The Orthodox Church believes homosexuality is a sin.” Both groups 8 have remained silent on the issue in Chechnya.

To bring justice the victims and punish those who belong to the local security forces for their role in these disappearances and torture, Russia must commit to fully investigating these violations of the rights of LGBT people. Given that the previous investigations did not reach convincing results, the Russian Federation should create a special investigation committee “comprised of experienced federal prosecutors and police investigators in order to undertake an
effective, impartial, and transparent investigation of the allegations” (Benedek, 2018). The international community must continue to hold Russia to its human rights standards as outlined by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Some might argue that Chechnya should be responsible for carrying out the investigation of allegations against the country, but this would not be effective, considering Chechnya refuses to even acknowledge the issue as of now. Russia, as the larger and more powerful state, should hold Chechnya to higher human rights standards by setting a new precedent for handling human rights violations, showing Chechnya that its actions will not go unpunished and will no longer be ignored.

Widespread homophobia leading to violations of human rights against LGBT people in Chechnya should not be tolerated under any circumstance. The lack of accountability of government officials highlights the democratic deficit and is worsened by the culture of fear instilled in media outlets throughout the country. Russia must use its power to shut down the current detention facilities, and should spearhead investigations of allegations in Russia to ensure independence of the judiciary, and to remain in good standing with the international community.

Works Cited
Gehlbach, Scott. “Reflections on Putin and the Media.” Post Soviet Affairs, vol. 26, 2010, pp.
77-87.
“Attitudes To Homosexuals in Russia: Content, Structure, and Predictors.” Psychology Journal
of the Higher School of Economics, vol. 13, pp. 79-110.
Poushter, Jacob. “Russia’s moral barometer: Homosexuality unacceptable, but drinking, less so.”
Pew Research Center, February 6, 2014.
Benedek, Wolfgang. “OSCE Rapporteur’s Report under the Moscow Mechanism on alleged
Human Rights Violations and Impunity in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation.”
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights, December 13, 2018.
LeVine, Steve. “Murder On An Elevator.” Putin’s Labyrinth, Random House, 2009. pp 103-121.
Print.
“Russian Public Opinion 2017.” Levada Analytical Center, 2018. pp. 174-175

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The Sami and Russian Arctic Policy

Anonymous — Mon, 29 Apr 2019 15:15:23 +0000

The Sami and Russian Arctic Policy Anonymous (not verified) Mon, 04/29/2019 - 09:15

Student Name: KD Masar

Course: PSCI 3022

Instructor: Prof. Sarah Sokhey

Published: March 15, 2019

Global warming is changing the face of the Earth, and Russia's location in the North puts it in prime position to control the melting Arctic. The melting of ice and warming of the climate will create new shipping lanes and reveal numerous natural resources, including fisheries, oil, and natural gas. The state in control of these resources will benefit economically and militarily. However, the Arctic will still be incredibly cold and hard to navigate despite the melting ice, and it will not be easy to harness the resources or claim them before they are available. In order to survive the Arctic and harness its economic and militaristic benefits, the Russian government should ask for the help of the Sami people.

The economic importance of the Arctic is significant. The US Department of the Interior estimates that the Arctic is home to 70% of undiscovered oil and gas. Russia's economy is highly dependent on these two resources, so control over these resources would ensure that the administration could remain in power and keep the population from protesting for many years to come. Furthermore, the disappearing ice would create new trade routes that would be perfect for transporting the new resources. The distance from Europe to Asia will decrease to a third of its current length once the ice melts since Russia will be able to ship resources through the Arctic. If the Russian government expects to control these resources successfully and protect them from piracy, it will also need to continue expanding its military into the North. Unfortunately, Arctic projects are expensive and dangerous. In order to fund these endeavors, the Russian government will need to be as efficient as possible by finding the best methods of travelling and surviving in the Arctic.

The Arctic military expansion is already being seen on the Kola Peninsula: ever since the dissolution of the USSR, it has been home to Russia's only ice-free port. Russia has also created an Arctic Brigade which incorporates reindeer and dog sleds, tactics that are not only more cost-effective but they are also better suited to the harsh environments than snow mobiles. The Sami people, an indigenous group native to an area spanning the Northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia's Kola Peninsula, have traditionally herded reindeer in this region and have the knowledge to successfully maintain herds in the harsh environment. Unfortunately, the majority of the Sami people are unemployed and are unable to herd reindeer due to urbanization and an increasingly non-subsistence lifestyle. The traditional knowledge of the Sami people is disappearing with their changing ways of life.

The Russian government should hire Sami people to maintain their reindeer herds and train the Russian Arctic Brigade to exist in the Arctic. The Russian government would decrease unemployment in the Kola Peninsula, gain knowledge to increase the efficiency of its Arctic Brigade, and create cooperation between itself and the Sami people. The Russian Sami want a share of the natural resources that get harvested from the Peninsula because of their historic claim to the land, and they could use cooperation on reindeer herding to foster discussions on resource control. Amid rising levels of protesting and disconten, the Russian government cannot afford protests over indigenous rights, domestic or international. Strengthening Russian relations with the Sami will in turn strengthen the overall image of the government and its treatment of indigenous populations. Additionally, increased economic activity from the Arctic resources would limit the amount of discontentment with the Russian government as well as improve the military with the traditional Sami knowledge. Cooperation between the two would also increase the welfare of the Sami people by creating jobs that have traditional significance.

Opposition may claim that the Sami and government could never get along. The Sami reindeer herders often accuse the soldiers of shooting their reindeer, a sign of conflict between the two groups. Disagreements like this would make it difficult for the military and Sami to work together. However, the Russian Sami should consider helping the military as a step towards self-determination. They could also have more control over the resources if they cooperate with the government and aid in the Arctic endeavors. Furthermore, the Russian government needs to have access to the resources in the Arctic. With falling levels of approval amongst the Russian people due to decreased economic activity of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Putin administration needs to boost the economy. Even though the resources are not available immediately, this would give the regime a long-term economic plan to maintain stability. Additionally, conquering the Arctic would be a symbolic move, signifying the greatness of Russia and Putin and increasing his popularity as the leader of Russia. Putin has been known to equate the greatness of Russia with its large size, so expanding Russian territory would fit the rhetoric already used by the regime. Thus, despite the divide between the government and the Sami, it is in the best interest of both sides to get along.

The Russian government is attempting to conquer the Arctic, and it needs the knowledge of the Sami people to do so effectively and efficiently. By controlling the Arctic, Russia would control the resources and the trading routes that will eventually be available. In order to secure this future, it must create a military presence that will be able to protect these assets. The Sami's traditional knowledge of the Arctic would be incredibly beneficial to the Russian military as it creates its Arctic Brigade, and cooperation between the two groups would decrease tensions and foster discussions about resource control and indigenous rights.

References

Brown, D. Here's why Russian soldiers are riding around the Arctic on sleds pulled by Reindeer. Business Insider. 2017. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-soldiers-riding-around-the-arctic-on-sleds-pulled-by-reindeer-2017-9. Accessed 12 Mar 2019.

Laruelle, M. Putin the geographer. Riddle. 2018. Retrieved from https://www.ridl.io/en/putin-the-geographer/. Accessed 14 Mar 2019.

McFaul, M. Why Vladimir Putin is a terrible strategist. Washington Post Blogs. 2018. Retrieved from https://canvas.colorado.edu/courses/24775/files/2824673?module_item_id=1187911. Accessed 12 Mar 2019.

Madslien, J. Russia’s Sami fight for their lives. BBC. 21 December 2006. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6171701.stm. Accessed 12 Mar 2019.

Medvedev, D. Russian Federation’s Policy for the Arctic to 2020. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 30 March 2009. Retrieved from www.arctis-search.com/Russian+Federation+Policy+for+the+Arctic+to+2020. Accessed 12 Mar 2019.

Robertson, G. Russians are protesting! Why? Part 1: Putin's Vulnerable. Washington Post. 2017. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/31/russians-are-protesting-why-part-1-putins-vulnerable/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.af5cc3fb6124. Accessed 12 Mar 2019.

United States, Department of the Interior. Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. 2008. Retrieved from https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf. Accessed 12 Mar 2019.

United States, Department of the Interior. Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. 2008.

Medvedev, D. Russian Federation’s Policy for the Arctic to 2020. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 30 March 2009.

Brown, D. Here's why Russian soldiers are riding around the Arctic on sleds pulled by Reindeer. Business Insider. 2017.

Madslien, Jorn. Russia’s Sami fight for their lives. BBC. 21 December 2006.

Robertson, G. Russians are protesting! Why? Part 1: Putin's Vulnerable. Washington Post. 2017.

Madslien, Jorn. Russia’s Sami fight for their lives. BBC. 21 December 2006.

McFaul, M. Why Vladimir Putin is a terrible strategist. Washington Post Blogs. 2018.

Laruelle, M. Putin the geographer. Riddle. 2018.

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Sex Trafficking After Communism

Anonymous — Mon, 29 Apr 2019 15:10:06 +0000

Sex Trafficking After Communism Anonymous (not verified) Mon, 04/29/2019 - 09:10

Student Name: Kavya Kannan

Course: PSCI 3022

Instructor: Prof. Sarah Sokhey

Published: March 15, 2019

When the world thinks of the consequences of the Soviet Union collapse in 1991, sex trafficking is certainly not the first to come to mind. The image projected to the world during this time was a politically and economically unstable regime in dire need of rehabilitation. But the collapse of the Soviet Union left the Russian state weak and showed promise to traffickers internationally of Russia being involved in all aspects of the sex trafficking industry.

Sex trafficking is a “form of modern-day slavery in which individuals perform commercial sex through the use of force, fraud, or coercion” (“Sex Trafficking”). Coercion is the most emphasized principle in this practice as it involves persuading an individual to engage in sexual activity with the authority through means of “physical confinement, non-payment for services, withholding of wages and manipulation of debt” (Harroff-Tavel). For the purposes of sex trafficking, women and children are primarily targeted as they are the most vulnerable. Russia’s consistent negligence of the issue has allowed it to be reclassified as a Tier 3 country (from formerly being on the Tier 2-Watch List in 2013) because of the little progress they’ve made in countering the practice (“Russia”, U.S. Department of State). To counter domestic and foreign pressure, Putin instituted an amendment that slightly tightened the Criminal Code for traffickers in 2003. This amendment, though a reflection of progress, was clearly not a sufficient resolution. Politically motivated, this adjustment to the criminal code remains the only piece of legislation in response to this issue (Roache).

Currently more than a million people live in state of modern day slavery in Russia. More than 100,000 women are trafficked in Russia every year (Lee). Women are reported to service as many as 30 men in a single day. (“Russia”, Global slavery index) Russia is unique in that it serves as a source, transit, and destination country whereas countries generally fit under one of these designations. Source countries are those that provide an atmosphere of “poverty, oppression, lack of human rights, lack of social or economic opportunity, dangers from conflict or instability and similar conditions” (Addressing the Root Causes of Sex Trafficking). Source countries for the practice in Russia include Ukraine, Moldova, Vietnam, and Nigeria among others (“Russia”, U.S. Department of State).Transit countries, through which victims travel through to their final destination, are chosen for their weak border controls as well as proximity to the destination sites (“Trafficking Routes). It is for these reasons that Russia also serves as a prime transit country. Destination countries have much stronger economies than that of the origin countries, making them able to support a large commercial sex industry and pay victims more for their work (“Trafficking Routes). For the practice in Russia, destination sites include Russia itself (specifically more prosperous cities such as St. Petersburg and Moscow), Northeast and Central Asia, Europe, the US, and the Middle East. For some women, their first destination site may just be one among many, reflecting the continuous search for stability.

The practice of sex trafficking can be attributed to the view of women within Russian society. Reports show that women get paid, on average, 30-33% less than their male counterparts. Additionally, their involvement in the political sphere has been very limited as only 3 of 19 ministers and 11 deputies were women in 2012 (Zakirova). For single mothers and young women, this situation is extremely concerning as they desperately search for ways to support themselves and their families. Reports show that the number of women in poverty in Russia is significantly greater than males aged 30 and older. The desperation that poverty and lack of opportunity ensues leads women to resort to such dehumanizing measures as ways to continue living. Though they engage in the practice, more than 64% of women themselves claim sex trafficking is a “morally unacceptable way for women to work.” (Buckley).

Other causes of sex trafficking in Russia can be linked to the continued culture of alcoholism, unemployment, homelessness, and drug taking that was further proliferated by the collapse of the state in (Buckley, 25). The collapse of the Soviet Union plunged a majority of the Russian population into a state of poverty with the desire to sustain oneself running high. People sought easy ways to gain access to the central cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg that showed promise of a stable income and economic sustenance. Sex trafficking in the form of prostitution seemed to gain ground during this time as it was an easy route into these cities. The practice now is escape route from economic oppression in the modern Russian state (Buckley, 22). Another plausible explanation is Putin’s institution of authoritarianism within the state. With the establishment of the power vertical (Ruthland) as well as the Foreign Agent Law of 2012, anti-trafficking agencies in Russia have been forced to shut down or focus on less controversial topic areas (Dean). This can be directly correlated to an increase in sex trafficking rates as citizens no longer have access to education against participation in the practice nor do victims have a vessel for support in society.

The lack of efficient measures taken to eradicate sex trafficking in the region leaves Russia with a pressing legitimacy problem. 21% of the Russian population condemn prostitution as an appropriate source of income while 61.6% of the population also see prostitution as morally unacceptable. Additionally, 64.8% of the population view sex trafficking as a growing and serious, large or enormous concern within society, showing the need for action (Buckley, 9). For Russia to truly see any substantive change with the practice, a few crucial steps need to be taken. First, there needs to be a proper protocol to handle victims. This can come in the form of additional support to health care officials for proper screening procedures and treatment of the victim. Additionally, because of the prevalence of the practice, it would be advised for the government to create a body to monitor trafficking and anti-trafficking efforts throughout the region. Funding to NGO’s that have already mobilized anti-trafficking efforts in Russia would also bolster efforts to combat sex trafficking (Lee). On the international scheme, countries need to create a systematic approach to collecting data on this practice as it is very vague and unreliable. Only then can countries truly understand the scope of sex trafficking in their country and address it by themselves or succumb to international pressure (Laczko).

Russia’s ineffective response to sex trafficking is a result of negligence and the invisible nature of sex trafficking. Because the practice often goes easily undetected, many women become ensnared in its ways and find it difficult to escape as no other viable economic opportunities surround them. Institutional change must be made for the Russian regime to see any reduction in sex trafficking. But with the prevalence of the culture within the regime, the question becomes when the Russian regime will take action, not if

Works Cited:

“Addressing the Root Causes of Sex Trafficking.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Buckley , Mary. “Human Trafficking In and Out of Russia.” Fair Observer, 9 May 2014, www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/human-trafficking-and-out-russia/.

Buckley , Mary. “Public Opinion in Russia on the Politics of Human Trafficking.” JSTOR, vol. 61, no. 2, Mar. 2009, pp. 231–248.

Dean, Laura. “A Stage for Human Trafficking: The World Cup in Russia.” Wilson Center, 19 June 2018, www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/stage-for-human-trafficking-the-world-cup-russia.

Gehlbach, Scott “Reflections on Putin & the Media,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 26:1, 2010, pp. 77-87

Harroff-Tavel , Hélène, and Alix Nasri. “Tricked and Trapped: Human Trafficking in the Middle East.” International Labor Organization, 2013.

Laczko, Frank. “Human Trafficking: The Need for Better Data.” Migrationpolicy.org, 2 Mar. 2017, www.migrationpolicy.org/article/human-trafficking-need-better-data.

Lee, Ying Chieh. “HUMAN TRAFFICKING ACROSS BORDERS AND THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL RESPONSE.” Master Theses CUNY Academic Works, 2014, pp. 51–54.

Roache, Madeline. “Putin Doesn't Care about Sex Trafficking.” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 13 July 2018, foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/13/putin-doesnt-care-about-sex-trafficking-russia-nigeria-world-cup-soccer/.

“Russia.” Global Slavery Index, Dec. 2018, www.globalslaveryindex.org/2018/findings/country-studies/russia/.

“Russia.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, June 2017, www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2017/271269.htm.

Rutland, Peter. 2000. “Putin’s Rise to Power,” Post-Soviet Affairs.

“Sex Trafficking .” National Human Trafficking Hotline, Polaris, 2018.

“Trafficking Routes.” Trafficking Routes, Dec. 2018, www.stopvaw.org/trafficking_routes.

Zakirova, Venera. “Gender Inequality in Russia: the Perspective of Participatory Gender Budgeting.” Reproductive Health Matters, vol. 22, no. 44, 2014, pp. 202–212., doi:10.1016/s0968-8080(14)44806-7.

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The Threat of Nationalism in Putin’s Russia

Anonymous — Mon, 29 Apr 2019 15:08:26 +0000

The Threat of Nationalism in Putin’s Russia Anonymous (not verified) Mon, 04/29/2019 - 09:08

Student Name: Sergey Gitalov

Course: PSCI 3022

Instructor: Prof. Sarah Sokhey

Published: March 15, 2019

The 2014 events in Crimea and Ukraine are commonly seen in the West as a rise of Russian nationalism. Russians overwhelmingly supported the government despite Western sanctions [1]. However, Putin is not a nationalist, but a pragmatist. His internal policy is diametrically opposite to nationalism. He avoids instability in an ethnically diverse country, while keeping the federal authority supreme. This is a dangerous strategy that could create long-term destabilizing effects.

From the start, Putin never had a concrete national ideology. In fact, it is dubious whether the current government has a national idea at all [2]. Patriotic attitudes seeded by the government seem to focus on Russia’s vastness and natural beauty, and its unique position, rather than ethnic Russians [3]. Putin has no problem prasing both imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, both of which differ radically from modern Russia. These statements seem to be patriotic and pragmatic in nature rather than in any degree nationalist.

State-centralization in the early 2000s also cannot be called a nationalist move, since it did not benefit the Russian-majority regions in the long run. The federal government heavily subsidizes the republics. Dagestan, Yakutia, Chechnya, Crimea, Buryatia, Tyva, and Bashkiria are among the top ten subjects of the federation receiving subsidies in 2019 [4]. Dagestan alone received 66 billion rubles from the federal budget. So all centralization did for Russians in the regions is take away the regions’ much-needed self-governance and replaced it with the omnipresent Kremlin’s directives.

Another unpopular move by Putin is his lenient migration policy that resulted in negative attitudes towards worker-migrants. The Russian government remains pro-migration, and only episodically cracks down on illegal migrants. Central Asian countries, where the majority of worker-migrants come from, remain visa-free. The Russian public does not seem to approve of this though. In Levada’s polling question of whether to limit the influx of migrants or not, 80% of people responded positively in March 2016 as opposed to only 45% in July 2002 [5]. This is also reflected in the Russian nationalist movement, which mostly targets migrants in their ideologies [6].

This disparity between the government policy and the Russian attitudes can prove to be detrimental if the regime weakens. Various Russian opposition groups can use nationalism as a leverage against Putin. In fact, a prominent opposition leader, Navalniy, openly opposed the visa-free regime and subsidies in the past [7]. He even participated in the “Khvatit Kormit’ Kavkaz” (Stop Feeding the Caucasus) movement in 2011 [8]. Navalniy gained prominence with his anti-corruption charges, but they may not last that long. Keeping up an anti-corruption campaign in the current post-election climate lacks sensationalism. The government had been elected, the new elections are far in the future. For long-term opposition campaigns to gather support, they would require an ideological backbone. Nationalism could be this backbone, and would be very problematic to address by the government.

One way to prevent far-right movements from gaining large scale support in the future is for the Russian government to address the ethnic issues today. Putin cannot keep being vague about migration and the republics forever. The government can use its media influence to create a more cosmopolitan climate in Russia, and directly admit issues related to migration. This could ease the tensions and present the government as honest and eager to admit it is not perfect.

The Russian government, however, prefers to use censorship against the far-right. The infamous 282th article was used to arrest prominent far-right activists like Maxim Martsinkevich, Aleksandr Potkin (Belov), and Konstantin Krylov. Far-right media are regularly censored [9]. This is part of the larger campaign of the Russian government to silence any opposition. These policies seem effective against the far-right right now. Nationalists are fractured and have no single strong movement [9]. Far-right movements have gone low-profile.

This hardline censorship may seem effective in the short term, but it does nothing in the long term. Persecuted groups still can find ground and support on the internet. Shutting down one website will prompt creation of another. A modern 21st century government physically cannot control all the flow of information. All censorship does is anger the opposition groups and radicalize them even further. So if nationalist attitudes are one day on the rise in Russia, these groups will resurface and spread their extremist views with unprecedented fervor. One great example of this resurfacing is the rise of nationalism in the USSR in the 80s. However, unlike in the USSR, there is no need for glasnost’ to trigger it; the internet is sufficient.

Putin is a pragmatic leader, who bends ideological beliefs to his benefit. His actions can be seen as nationalist by an outside observer, but a closer look reveals that his internal policies anger both the Russian public and the far-right. Far-right groups in Russia could potentially use that to their advantage. To counter that, the government should directly and honestly address these issues to ease the tensions, instead of censoring the opposition.

References:
[1] Frye T, Gehlbach S, Marquardt K.L, Reuter O.R. (2017) Is Putin’s popularity real?,
Post-Soviet Affairs , 33:1, 1-15, doi: 10.1080/1060586X.2016.1144334
[2] Remington, T. F. (2016). Politics in Russia . London: Routledge. Ch 1.
[3] Laruelle, M. (2018, November 02). Putin the Geographer.
https://www.ridl.io/en/putin-the-geographer/
[4] FINCAN (2019). Дотации регионам России 2019.
http://fincan.ru/articles/41_dotacii-regionam-rossii-2019/
[5] Levada-Center (2017, May 29). Attitudes Toward Migrants.
https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/05/29/attitudes-toward-migrants/
[6] Laruelle, M. (2010). The Ideological Shift on the Russian Radical Right. Problems of
Post-Communism, 57 (6), 19-31. doi:10.2753/ppc1075-8216570602
[7] Navalniy, A (2015, November 15). Где проходит «оргия толерантности»?
https://navalny.com/t/92/
[8] Navalniy, A (2011, September 30). Общенациональная кампания "Хватит кормить
Кавказ".
https://navalny.livejournal.com/627082.html
[9] Chistyakov, P, Krylov K. (2018, October 22) Константин Крылов — о русском нацдвиже,
Украине и провокаторах. YouTube . 49:40 - 1:01:00.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FJldBnyfxFA

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A Disastrous Marriage: A Look into a Theoretical Russia-Belarus Union

Anonymous — Mon, 29 Apr 2019 15:02:49 +0000

A Disastrous Marriage: A Look into a Theoretical Russia-Belarus Union Anonymous (not verified) Mon, 04/29/2019 - 09:02

Student Name: Ben Deitsch

Course: PSCI 3022

Instructor: Prof. Sarah Sokhey

Published: March 15, 2019

Belarusian President Alexandr Lukashenko’s February announcement that Belarus was “ready to unite” their state with Russia didn’t raise much of a response from the West, perhaps suspecting that the statement was not particularly serious.1 However, Lukashenko’s question of "Are you – Russians and Belarusians – ready for it?” is an interesting one.1 What would be the outcome of such a union, and would that outcome be desirable in the first place? The purpose of this paper is to consider the outcomes of a Russian-Belarusian Union and ultimately suggest that such a union would be against the interests of the Russian state.

The economic and political state of Belarus is dire, and is reflected in Belarus’ interests in a true unification treaty. Belarus’ economy is approximately one-thirtieth the size of Russia’s, with GDP per capita at approximately one half of the Russian level. 2, 3 Belarus currently is in many ways subsidized by the Russian state, with some estimates suggesting that up to 20% of Belarusian revenues are the direct result of Russian subsidies.4 Belarus is also extremely dependent on Russia in terms of international trade, with Russia making up 44% of exports and 56% of imports.5 The Belarusian economy is largely in the public sector, with only 15% of economic activity in the private sector, meaning that salaries, infrastructure, and other business expenditures are often footed by the government.6 All of this comes at a time when Belarus’ debt would likely have to be paid by Russia to avoid default.7 It is additionally important to note the Russia has very little economic interest in the region, with Andrey Suzdaltsev, a researcher at the Moscow Higher School of Economics stating that Russia’s only real economic interests in the region are a few modernized refineries and a single fertilizer company, otherwise the economic relationship is completely “asymmetric”.4 Additionally, many of Russia’s economic problems (and hurdles for the Putin regime) such as public research, poverty reduction, public education, demographic transition (i.e. pensions), and infrastructure investment are ones best solved by government expenditure. 8,9 Put succinctly, “many Russian regions can justly demand subsidies before Belarus.” 10

It is therefore my suggestion that the Russian government not pursue a full political union with Belarus. The Russian government need not take on additional expenditures at a time when the Russian state should be funneling money into domestic initiatives. The Belarusian State, with its variety of economic policies, is a liability that the Russian government need not accept. Pursuing supranational policies is instead the superior alternative and more flexible for both states. Strengthening economic ties through a continued customs union and international loans/ subsidies has many of the benefits of a political union without the necessary burden of completely supporting the Belarusian state. Through the Eurasian Customs Union, the two states are currently free to strengthen economic ties, facilitating Russian exports to the region and providing a framework to strengthen both nations’ economy.11 The Russian state would also befree to supply the state with subsidies on its terms, subsidies that allow the Russian government to influence the political direction of Belarus.12 Continuing to pursue the status quo is the best possible option for the Russian state that provides both the benefits of the Belarusian partnership, without incurring the significant political and economic costs of integrating a poorer region into an already poor country.

It could be objected that a Russian-Belarusian integration treaty could be a military advantage for the Russian state, if nothing else. However, this is shortsighted for a variety of reasons. The first being that the Russian state already has a military presence in Belarus. As early as 2002, a paper for NATO stated unequivocally in the first sentence: “Belarus has been transformed into a Russian military outpost.” 13 This continues to this day, with Russia conducting the 2017 Zapad War Games in Belarus (with some claiming this was an elaborate way for Russia to station troops in Belarus).14, 15 Clearly, under the status quo, Russia has extensive military access to the Belarusian state, and taking on the economic costs would seem to accomplish nothing except perhaps further provoking NATO.16 There is also the claim that a formal integration treaty could serve to stabilize the famously shaky relationship between the two states, however, this is a misreading of the situation. Belarus’ ties to Russia are so strong that any reorientation to the EU or NATO would be illogical. Lukashenko’s recent flirtations with the West don’t represent a massive shift, rather they are merely a bit of “truancy” from an otherwise subservient ally.17, 18

For economic and military reasons, the Russian government should not seriously consider a full political union with Belarus. The benefits of such a union could be obtained in the status quo, or through measures that do not amount to the full integration of the Belarusian state, and the potential economic and geopolitical ramifications of such a treaty do not offset the costs in a relationship that would provide little (if not a net negative) for the Russian state. Ultimately, it is likely the recent incarnation of unification talks on the part of Lukashenko is merely another round of political havering, which is probably better for all parties involved.

Works Cited:
1 The Moscow Times Editorial Staff. “Belarus Ready to 'Unite' With Russia, Lukashenko Says.”
The Moscow Times, The Moscow Times, 15 Feb. 2019, www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/02/15/
were-ready-unite-with-russia-belarus-leader-lukashenko-says-a64517.
2 “Russia: Overview.” World Bank, The World Bank Group, 11 Oct. 2018, www.worldbank.org/
en/country/russia/overview.
3 “Belarus: Overview.” World Bank, The World Bank Group, 2018, www.worldbank.org/en/
country/belarus/overview.
4 Biernat, Jakub. “Russia No Longer Wants to Subsidize Belarus.” Central European Financial
Observer, Narodowy Bank Polski, 27 Nov. 2018, financialobserver.eu/cse-and-cis/russia-nolonger-
wants-to-subsidize-belarus/.
5 “Belarus.” Observatory of Economic Complexity, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018,
atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/blr/.
6 Danilovich, Alex. Russian-Belarusian Integration: Playing Games Behind the Kremlin Walls.
Routledge, 2018.
7 UA Wire Editorial Staff. “Belarus Asks Russia for $1 Billion to Repay Debts.” Uawire.org, 16
Aug. 2018, uawire.org/lukashenko-asks-russia-for-1-billion-to-repay-debts.
8 Sokhey, Sarah Wilson. “Reversing Pension Policy in Russia...Again.” Foreign Policy Research
Institute, Aug. 2018, www.fpri.org/article/2018/08/reversing-pension-policy-in-russia-again/.
9 BBC Editorial Staff. “Russia Pension: Protests over Retirement Age Hikes.” BBC News, BBC,
1 July 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44675582.
10 Oldberg, Ingmar. “Sunset over the Swamp – the Independence and Dependence of Belarus.”
European Security, vol. 6, no. 3, 1997, pp. 110–130., doi:10.1080/09662839708407328.
11 Carneiro, Francisco G. “What Promises Does the Eurasian Customs Union Hold for the
Future?” World Bank Economic Premises, The World Bank Group, Feb. 2013,
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/EP108.pdf.
12 British Embassy in Minsk. “Macroeconomic Update: How Big Is the Russian Energy Subsidy
to Belarus.” Macroeconomic Update: How Big Is the Russian Energy Subsidy to Belarus, IPM
Research Center, 26 Mar. 2018, eng.research.by/analytics/macroforecast/1802/.
13 Martinsen, Kaare Dahl. “The Russian-Belarusian Union and the Near Abroad.” Norwegian
Institute for Defence Studies, June 2002, pp. 1–35., www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/
martinsen.pdf.
14 Radio Free Europe Editorial Staff. “Ukraine's Military Chief Says Russia Left Troops In
Belarus After War Games.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 29
Sept. 2017, www.rferl.org/a/belarus-ukraine-says-russia-left-troops-after-zapad-games/
28764925.html.
15 Mehta, Aaron. “Lessons from Zapad - Jamming, NATO and the Future of Belarus.” Defense
News, Defense News, 27 Nov. 2017, www.defensenews.com/global/2017/11/22/lessons-fromzapad-
jamming-nato-and-the-future-of-belarus/.
16 Sokolsky, Richard. “The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European
Security.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 Mar. 2017, carnegieendowment.org/
2017/03/13/new-nato-russia-military-balance-implications-for-european-security-pub-68222.
17 Wilson, Andrew. “Belarus's Game of Truancy.” ECFR, European Council on Foreign
Relations, 14 Feb. 2017, www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_belarus_game_of_truancy_7232.
18 Pakhomov, Nikolay. “Why Belarus Can't Afford to Be the New Ukraine.” The National
Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 23 Feb. 2017, nationalinterest.org/feature/whybelarus-
cant-afford-be-the-new-ukraine-19535.

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Economic Inequality in Russia

Anonymous — Fri, 26 Apr 2019 22:28:10 +0000

Economic Inequality in Russia Anonymous (not verified) Fri, 04/26/2019 - 16:28

Student Name: Georgia Borison

Course: PSCI 3022

Instructor: Prof. Sarah Sokhey

Published: March 15, 2019

One common saying in economics is “a rising tide lifts all boats,” meaning improvements in the general economy will benefit all members participating in that economy. This is the lens through which this policy brief is written: in order to help strengthen its overall economy, Russia must dedicate time and resources into the those most in need, because people struggling for their survival are unable to focus on anything else, much less contribute to the economic prosperity of their country. This paper aims to answer the questions of why economic inequality is so extreme throughout Russia, what are its effects, and what can the Russian government do it mitigate and close the wealth gap?

Political scientist Thomas F. Remington conducted an empirical analysis in which he tested how different factors, such as urbanization or mineral resource extraction share in output, affected the average real wages in different Russian regions (Table 1.1 below). His findings coincide with the theory that regions with higher mineral resource extraction shares of output have substantially higher regional wages. This empirical analysis is intersectional, which means when that variable is observed, all other variables are held constant. The mineral resource extraction variable also has a p-value<0.001, making its room for error very small and therefore these results can be trusted. Additionally, data collected by the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth concluded that regions in Russia that have oil, gas, and minerals industries as at least 50% of their economic output have, on average, 33% higher incomes than other areas of Russia . A graphic representation of this disparity can be seen in Graph 1.1 below.

According to studies of the world’s major economies analyzed by the World Inequality Database, Russia is the most divided in terms of socioeconomic classes . In the 1990s, amidst all the chaos of the Yeltsin presidency, a new, entrepreneurial class emerged. These entrepreneurs were called the oligarchs, and they took advantage of the chaos and corruption of the 90s for their own personal gain. Many of these oligarchs hold monopolies in the oil and gas industry—another reason that this industry is so lucrative, but few Russians benefit from that wealth. A report published by NPR found that as of 2013, 110 individuals harbor 35% of household wealth in Russia. One reason for this is that after 2001, Russia replaced its individual income tax rate system with one, flat, income tax rate of 13%. Although this tax is technically “equal” because it is 13% for everybody, those in poverty are carrying a much heavier burden because they are starting with so much less. Graph 2.1 shows the disparity in income and wealth of the top 1% and the bottom 50% of Russians.

If the Russian government wants to minimize economic inequality, resulting in a stronger overall economy, it must do it in multiple parts. First, Russia must implement a progressive income tax. This tax would help to even out the playing field, and poorer families would be able to use more of their money for personal necessities. The Russian government must also try to enforce tax payments. The oligarchs are notorious for tax avoidance , so much so that the actual wealth of these people is often unknown. The government must more strictly enforce tax collection from these titans of industry.

Second, while some of the taxes collected from the rich should still go toward what they were initially paying for (i.e. social welfare programs), the Russian government should use these new tax surpluses to invest in industries other that oil, gas, and minerals, and therefore help to diversify its industry. This diversification would both strengthen Russia’s overall economy and help boost the poorer regions void of oil and gas. Russian economist Viktor Ishaev even believed that this investment would not be as daunting as one might think. Existing capital is being underutilized, and a burst of investment could put these resources back to productive use; “a practically free source of economic growth.” Even less money would be needed to boost struggling regions by, for example, recycling under-utilized capital.

Some might argue that the key to aiding the Russian Federation’s economic inequality and the subsequent economic benefits would be focusing on foreign investment rather than restructuring the tax system. Although, economically speaking, foreign investment can often boost domestic economies, this route is unfeasible. The current investment climate in Russia is weak right now; some of the most concerning aspects for investors are Russia’s unstable regulations, unfavorable economic developments, and its complicated business environment. Russia’s ongoing conflicts in places like Ukraine and Crimea are also reasons for investors to hold back; wars like these increase costs and restrictions on investments. Foreign investment is usually a good way for countries to boost their economies, but in the case of the Russian Federation, the problem goes deeper.

The Russian Federation is facing a huge problem with its economy. Income and wealth inequality are higher in Russia than any of the other major world economies. Because of this, Russia is not working at its full economic potential. The best way for Russia to work towards a more economically equal society is enacting a progressive tax rate, ensuring it is enforced, and using funds from those taxes to diversify their industries. Lifting the lowest members of society will lead to a more prosperous life for all.

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